Headlines

• Northam traincare depot was opened on 2 July. Excellent that it was built on a brown-field site. Idiotic that it will bring many empty-stock workings to a section of track that is purportedly so congested that passenger train services in the area are being cut. From press reports, the opening appears to have been a fairly low-key affair with no Ministers present . One person who did attend was Stagecoach Chairman, Brian Souter, who has variously offended people living in the South by claiming that they write letters of complaint in their firms' time, and by his description of them as "wine drinking, courgette and mangetout-eating, semi-detached dwelling New Labour voters". Just because his sister could afford to live in a castle…

• SWT's rolling stock reshuffle has started. For example, ancient 8-coach formations on the 16.45 and 18.05 Waterloo-Poole have been respectively replaced by 5-coach and 10-coach Wessex Electric formations. So the 16.45 is overcrowded and the 18.05 has spare capacity. Load factors could be improved if the 18.05 ran to Poole without the current long layover at Brockenhurst. In addition, its running is notably erratic because the more powerful stock means it has 8 minutes' slack en route to Winchester. Just before the reshuffle, the 18.05 was involved in a serious door smash at Clapham Junction.

• The Romsey-Totton service has made a good start, with public funding. SWT initially introduced a fares rip-off from the new station at Chandlers Ford.

• Most insecure station? - Fratton, Portsmouth's busy suburban station, has become a centre for drugs dealers.

• It seems that the greatest threat to rural branch lines is failure to regulate the rolling stock companies. At the Rail Passengers Council's meeting at Bristol, it was revealed that coaches which cost taxpayers £500,000 in 1988 are being leased for £250,000 a year. So, on heavily-subsidised lines, taxpayers are effectively re-purchasing the same coaches every few years.

• Time for a Parliamentary Inquiry? Hog-Rider warned in 2001 that the lack of transparency in franchising could lead to rejected companies going for judicial review. First Group threatened to do just that over its Great Eastern franchise, but has reportedly decided not to proceed. Connex are now considering their position. The Group's researches (see separate article) reveal that public statements about franchising decisions appear inconsistent, and create the impression that the goal posts are constantly moving. The evidence seems to suggest that Virgin and Stagecoach have been favoured in comparison with First Group and Connex.

• Strands of thinking in the SRA's Capacity Utilisation studies are that timings should be more standard and trains with empty seats could make more stops. On the Bournemouth line many commuters have a poor morning service while Virgin trains run for a handful of passengers. Yet SWT say they cannot put a much-needed Totton stop (to compensate for a connectional service which they axed several years ago) into the 06.19 Poole-Waterloo because Virgin's 06.28 service from Bournemouth to Glasgow is allowed 3 minutes less than the standard Virgin time from Bournemouth to Southampton and would therefore block the platform at Bournemouth to a retimed 06.19. SWT also say they are not a party to Virgin timetabling. Yet Stagecoach runs SWT and has a 49% share in Virgin. With such lack of co-operation in the interests of passengers, one wonders why the cover of the National Rail Timetable bears the words "National Rail Britain's train companies working together"!

• The Crossrail plan for a mainline railway tunnel from Paddington to Stratford is again under active discussion. Oddly, a proposed South Western branch would terminate at Norbiton (for Kingston hospital), one station short of the SWT main line. Given that the tunnel would swallow up substantial resources, equity would suggest that its services should be as accessible as possible, with interchange facilities maximised.

On Tuesday 6 May, the 18.05 Waterloo-Poole (an express train with first stop Winchester) was formed of two 4-VEP outer suburban units, with No. 3457 leading. The sliding window ventilators on these trains are permanently bolted together, and passengers can get ventilation only through the droplights in the doors. On this warm evening many droplights were open. An open droplight is much more vulnerable to flying objects from outside than were the higher level sliding ventilators.

As the train entered the bend at Clapham Junction at speed, there were tremendous crashes as an open door on a passing train scraped the side of the front of the third carriage (no 62197) and then scraped the middle of the carriage. There was a cascade of broken glass between these points and immediately outside one of the few non-opening windows. A number of glass pellets were catapulted through the open droplight at the front of the carriage but landed harmlessly on the floor.

About 5 minutes later, two members of the train-crew arrived. After continuing at normal speeds, the train made a special stop at Woking for several minutes, and one of them photographed the scrape marks.

Had the glass shattered outside an open window rather than outside the non-opening window, there is every likelihood that commuters would have suffered injury.

The incident raises several safety issues: (1) relying on droplights adjacent to seating bays for ventilation, instead of higher level sliding ventilators (2) window glass not being shatterproof (3) why was it necessary to inspect the train some 20 minutes later at Woking but not immediately after the incident occurred? (4) why was the door on the passing train not secure? The potential dangers to passengers on the train with the open door were even greater.

A member of the Group did of course make an immediate report to the Health and Safety Executive. They have confirmed the facts, but have been unable to establish how the door of the passing train, stated to be the 16.25 from Portsmouth, came to be open.

The Romsey-Totton service duly started on Sunday 18 May, with stops at the new platform at Chandlers Ford from the outset. This was the first time the two towns had been directly linked by rail since the mid-1960s when there was a Sundays-only Hampshire Diesel train at 13.12 from Romsey to Bournemouth. The new service is normally run with two modern class 170 diesel trains (occasionally, as on the morning of 27 May, class 159 units are in use), with unit 170 301 on the first service to Totton. This service brought about 30 passengers to the town, including County Rail Officer Mike Hedderly and his predecessor (now SWT Salisbury Area Manager) Mike Franklin.

From the same day, Solent Blue line commenced their Summer bus timetable with revised services (and revised route numbers) in the Eastleigh/Chandlers Ford area. The cheerful cover of their timetable booklet celebrates the Costa del Chandlers Ford, complete with buses, train and station.

The new service is excellent news, and full marks are due to Hampshire County Council, which has been trying to bring trains back to Chandlers Ford for over a decade, and had to overcome successive hurdles. It is a pity that the BBC's transport correspondent, Paul Clifton, gave a pessimistic prognosis in his TV coverage. This happened because the projected weekly usage was presented as monthly.

The Southern Daily Echo of 17 May reported that the County Council has put £2m into building Chandlers Ford station, and the SRA has provided £3.34m over 3 years to cover running costs for the station and service. So this is basically a publicly-funded project, with little credit to SWT operator Stagecoach. The Government's 10-year transport plan is being seriously undermined because the private sector is swallowing huge amounts of public money whilst failing to invest on any great scale itself, and we are very lucky to get this new service.

By 11 June, the Echo was reporting a fares rip-off by SWT. Passengers were allegedly being charged £4.20 to travel 7.75 miles from the new station at Chandlers Ford to Southampton, but only £2.70 for the 13-mile journey from Romsey. The existing Romsey fare had been set by Wessex Trains for journeys via Redbridge, a distance of 8.25 miles. On a pro-rata basis, Wessex Trains could have been expected to charge about £2.55 for the Chandlers Ford-Southampton journey, so why was SWT charging nearly 65% more? SWT claimed they could not change the fare until September. The danger was that people would try out the service in the meantime, discover how expensive it was, and be discouraged from using it. However, it appears that pressure was applied, because we understand that, by mid-June, a zonal fares structure was expected to have almost immediate introduction.

The new service will achieve its full potential only if fares are set at a reasonable level, and the scheduled connections work. On the first day, the 07.50 Waterloo-Bournemouth was supposed to connect into the new services for Chandlers Ford, Romsey, Swaythling, St Denys, Millbrook and Redbridge. In the event, the 07.50, formed of a pair of ancient slam-door units, was 25 minutes late and all these connections were missed.

Franchising: Is it seen to be impartial?

• So what are the criteria?

• In the Conservatives' original franchising exercise, the cheapest bid won. Stagecoach got the SWT franchise with a bid just £200,000 less than that of the existing BR management, and then disposed of 71 train drivers and 125 middle managers with the result that the timetable collapsed within a year. Huge public fury resulted (The South Hampshire Rail Users' Group has a collection of press cuttings) and Steven Norris, the junior transport minister at the time of the franchise exercise lamented "We in the Conservative Party were very happy at the way rail privatisation was going - new investment, new ideas, new services… SWT instantly unwound all that. It was so obviously to the disadvantage of passengers, and so clearly an act committed by a private company. It left a bad taste instantly in people's mouths about SWT". (quoted in "Stagecoach" by Christian Wolmar)

• So did OPRAF, the predecessor of the SRA, make clear that poor performance was unacceptable? Try the Guardian of 4 March 1997: "After the fiasco of the last six weeks the least O'Brien (the franchising director) could do, one feels, is to take Brian Cox, the managing director of South West Trains, bundle him in leg irons and cart him off to chokey. But not a bit of it. Instead, OPRAF adopts a laissez-faire attitude. The regulator, who declined to speak to the Guardian, is going out of his way via his press office to heap praise on the undeserving head of South West Trains. "We don't feel it is our role to come down on franchise holders at the first hint of a problem. It is up to South West Trains to sort it out". The Evening Standard of 24 April 1997 reported that 28,000 people had complained about SWT's services in their first year.

• Private Eye (No 940) noted that, whilst Stagecoach had made £62.7m clear profit from the Porterbrook rolling-stock company which it then owned, the government had given the company another £60.3m annual subsidy "so that they can make still more profit from late-running and shoddily-serviced South West Trains".

• So was Stagecoach contrite for the misery it had caused to thousands of commuters, and grateful for the huge sums it was continuing to receive from taxpayers? The Guardian of 5 January 1998 reported that Chairman Brian Souter had told a conference that people living south of a line from the Bristol Channel to the Wash were "wine drinking, courgette and mangetout-eating, semi-detached dwelling New Labour voters". On 14 May 1998 the Evening Standard reported anger that South West Trains had made a profit of £21m from its "abysmal" service during the preceding year, but had been fined only £1m.

• The Portsmouth "News" of 5 November 1998 reported that "The firm running Portsmouth's trains (SWT) has been fined more than any other operator since privatisation - £3m". The paper asked "Time to take the franchise away?" and "Why when we need to drag people out of their cars and on to public transport, should we put up with a service that is so unattractive?"

• The Southern Daily Echo of 20 May 1999 reported that "Train users in Hampshire are enduring worsening services … SWT has been hit with fines of £3.6m in March 1998-99, the highest in Britain … Mike Grant, franchising director said "Operators wishing to have a future in the rail industry need to deliver improved performance."

• The Evening Standard of 6 March 2000 reported that "South West Trains were fined a record £3.8m over running late" in the preceding 12 months.

• The Evening Standard of 14 June 2000 recorded that "South West Trains, heavily criticised for its appalling service to commuters, today announced record operating profits of more than £39m".

• The Evening Standard of 5 December reported that "Operating profits for SWT for the six months to the end of October rose by a quarter from £19.5m to £24.3m. At Virgin Rail, Stagecoach's share of the profits increased 29% from £5.9m to £7.6m".

• Meanwhile the franchise renewal exercise had started. Connex lost their South Central franchise, and the Government made clear that this was because they had failed their passengers. In the January 2001 edition of "Inside Labour" the Deputy Prime Minister stated " The Strategic Rail Authority has already shown its clout by taking action against one franchise for failing passengers".

• On that basis, Stagecoach had no hope of retaining South West Trains. They were now 20^th out of 26 in the SRA's own passenger satisfaction league tables. Rival bidders were GNER (3^rd place) and First (First Great Eastern, 9^th place). In addition, these rival bidders shared the National Rail Award 2000 for best operator.

• However, things were not that clearcut. In the Summer of 2000, Hansard recorded that Lord Berkeley had asked Lord Macdonald "In assessing bids for new or extended rail passenger franchises, what weight is given to: (a) present performance of franchisees; (b) new service proposals"; and (c) price offered".

• So now it gets complicated: the award of franchises is determined by a range of criteria with no specified weightings, but Connex lost its South Central franchise for failing passengers.

• No doubt that Stagecoach had made huge profits yet hugely failed its passengers on South West Trains, so … on 16 February 2001, the Guardian reported that Stagecoach had emerged as favourite to run the new South West Trains' 20-year franchise: "SWT has impressed the SRA by its straightforward approach to the bidding process. It has promised that by August next year it will start replenishing its fleet with 1,2000 new coaches, built by Siemens, the company responsible for the Heathrow Express".

• The Evening Standard of 4 April 2001 reported that "Morale among SWT commuters hit an all-time low with the announcement that owner Stagecoach has won the contract to run services for the next 20 years. Nearly 30% of suburban trains run late". SWT had failed over 5 years to give its passengers the quality of service they could reasonably expect, and Connex had lost its South Central franchise - in the words of the Deputy Prime Minister, for failing its passengers, but ... the Evening Standard of 2 April 2001 reported that "Mike Grant, the chief executive of the Strategic Rail Authority, said the franchise had remained with Stagecoach - SWT owner- because it had come up with significant passenger benefits".

• So what about those "significant passenger benefits"? Well, Andrew Haines - South West Trains' Managing Director - had listed them in the Southern Daily Echo of 6 February 2001:

• New and longer trains providing thousands of extra seats (it was recently reported in Modern Railways that the additional coaches for traffic growth are unlikely ever to runon SWT);

• Major station improvements to passenger facilities, disabled access and security (gates at "secure" stations are left unlocked in late evening when passenger security is a greater issue but potential revenue protection haul less. New customer information system causing huge problems - at Southampton Central it cannot cope when two trains use one platform. Real difficulties for elderly and disabled people who are seen off and met by friends/relatives because SWT omits stops and curtails journeys for operational convenience);

• Investing in "gold-plating" key sections of track and signalling, to ensure improved levels of reliability and punctuality (the SRA has now recognised that this is unrealistic and any improvement will be by Network Rail with public funding);
• A new station at Chandler's Ford by 2003, with a local service to Southampton (achieved; Hampshire County Council is paying for the station, and the SRA is meeting the running costs; SWT's huge fares to and from Chandlers Ford caused public anger)
• Opening the current freight branch line at Hythe to passenger trains, with new stations at Marchwood and Hythe (disappeared over the horizon);
• A new station at Southampton Eastern Docks (disappeared over the horizon. SWT claim congestion prevents a new station at nearby football stadium, and a massive depot for its new trains built there, meaning many empty-stock trains will add to congestion);
• Doubling of services between Portsmouth and Southampton (disappeared over the horizon);
• Connecting the Swanage branch to the main line (SWT was merely one of a number of partners in the scheme. Network Rail cannot give the scheme any priority);
• Infrastructure works to enable a half-hourly service between Weymouth and London (at the Rail Passengers Committee's public meeting at Basingstoke in July 2001, Mr Haines said there had never been an economic case).

• So how did Stagecoach get chosen for a franchise on the basis of passenger benefits which, so soon afterwards, were no longer in sight? Well, note the words of Mr Graham Eccles, SWT Chairman, in "Rail Professional" of May 2001: " For the big PR hit, what you do is add up guaranteed outputs, the primary aspirations and the secondary aspirations, and then you shout loudly". Could this be what the Guardian had referred to as Stagecoach's straightforward approach to the bidding process?

• SWT's annual profit for 2000-2001 further soared to £45m, equivalent to some 80-90% of taxpayers' subsidy for the year. Stagecoach explained the profit - disproportionate to that of other operators - in terms of its having been comparatively unaffected by the aftermath of the Hatfield crash. So why did it fail passengers to the extent that its annual fine rose from £3.9m to £11.5m? And why was it still in line for a new franchise when Connex, according to the Deputy Prime Minister, failed to get its new South Central franchise for failing passengers?

• At the beginning of 2002, SWT's long-suffering commuters were hit by a series of strikes on SWT over pay and the downgrading of a driver. Private Eye reports that Richard Bowker took the side of Stagecoach (which owns 49% of his former employer Virgin Rail) and waived SWT's fines for the misery caused to commuters. However, a tribunal found that the driver had been victimised for his union activities. It dismissed much of SWT's evidence as "incredible", "risible" and "implausible, even absurd". One key witness had appeared to give evidence "without regard for truth and solely with an eye to where the advantage lay". Does the SRA still admire the straightforwardness of SWT - the leaked initial reason for their favouring Stagecoach for a new franchise? And why hasn't it - so far as we are aware - reimposed the fines on SWT?

• The Evening Standard of 28 May 2002 reported, "Transport Secretary Stephen Byers said SWT is "not being operated as well as anybody would like. Its performance levels are not acceptable". He said if the SRA cannot negotiate a franchise renewal that puts the interests of the public first, it will be prepared to seek a new franchise operator". So, since performance levels were still so unsatisfactory, why didn't SWT lose the opportunity of a new franchise, like Connex South Central?

• On 7 June 2002, the Metro reported that South West Trains had been fined a record £12.5m for poor performance. It was criticised by the SRA, along with South Central, Thameslink and Silverlink (but not Connex South Eastern where performance had shot up from 67.8% to 84%). The Evening Standard of 12 September 2002 reported that performance on both Connex South Eastern and South West Trains had shown a downturn. Connex's punctuality had dropped from 86.3% to 84.7% and SWT's from 76% to 75.1%.

• On 24 October it was widely reported that Stagecoach had crashed because of difficulties with Coach USA. Shares, which once peaked at £2.84, dropped to 10p. The Times warned investors to avoid Stagecoach shares and bonds. The Guardian reported that Moodys credit rating agency had recently downgraded the company to junk status. The Evening Standard of 4 December reported that Stagecoach had written off most of the £1.3 billion it had paid for Coach USA 3 years previously. "Shareholders - of which Souter and his sister Ann Gloag speak for nearly 25% of the equity - will still be getting a dividend".

• On 6 November 2002, it was reported that the SRA had decided to let franchises for shorter periods. The reduction for SWT would be dramatic - its 20-year franchise would be reduced to three years. The Evening Standard stated that "Richard Bowker, the SRA chairman, said the SWT agreement would mean the company focusing "on what matters to passengers - recovering performance to a level that passengers deserve and expect and the replacement of slam-door trains with the biggest new train order in the UK". So Connex lost South Central for failing passengers (the Deputy Prime Minister said so) and Stagecoach gets a new 3-year franchise so that it can try to stop failing passenger (Richard Bowker says so).

• Meanwhile railway costs are soaring. Connex needed a £58m bail-out and Stagecoach needed £29m. And Private Eye reported that "When SRA Chairman and Chief Executive, Richard Bowker (former Virgin Rail co-chairman and son of senior Stagecoach executive Roger Bowker) appeared before the transport select committee last November, he was asked if the decision to hand Virgin an extra £106m was taken "because you wanted to prop up, say, Stagecoach who were having an AGM very rapidly after this discussion took place?" Bowker replied "The timing of Stagecoach's results announcement was important." Later he was asked, "you have told us consistently this afternoon that the arrangement was basically to stabilise the companies concerned?" To which Bowker replied "Correct". The MPs also asked Bowker why no other company was invited to bid for the West Coast franchise when it went pear-shaped. He said the SRA hadn't published its strategy for the West Coast line at the time, so neither it nor other operators knew what would be required from a new franchise. The draft strategy was published last October but there's still no sign of the SRA or another operator taking over."

• The Telegraph of 26 June 2003 noted that "Graham Eccles, Stagecoach's head of rail, revealed that the taxpayer would spend £282m this year subsidising Virgin's West Coast and Cross Country routes, now being run as management contracts. Under the original franchises, Virgin Rail was due to pay £8.2m this year for running them. It has already received £106m of extra support last year after Railtrack failed to deliver the West Coast upgrade for its 140mph trains. The SRA denied it was failing to control the rise in subsidies. Ceri Evans, the SRA communications director, said the Virgin Rail franchise model was "bust and we're fixing it". The shares, worth just 12.5p in October 2002, rose 4.25p to 61p.

• This seems an interestingly generous attitude to Virgin-Stagecoach. Yet Christian Wolmar had reported in "Rail" no 441 that "As another aside, the SRA is incandescent that Stagecoach suggested to analysts the deal might be worth between £250m and £465m. … The SRA responded that this was the result of a conversation that had never taken place and that "it was as near to a lie as you can get"."

• So the SRA would now spend hundreds of millions on stabilising companies, that was crystal-clear … until the day following the 26 June Telegraph article, when the Evening Standard reported that Connex had been sacked for failing customers. Hang on, compared with a year ago, Connex performance has fallen from 84% to 79.7% and SWT performance has improved from 71.2% to 72.2%. In other words, Connex has been consistently better than SWT, but Stagecoach is to be awarded a new franchise to enable it to improve on performance. Connex were asking for a further £200m but, whereas millions are available to stabilise Stagecoach shares, they are apparently not available to bail out Connex. "Connex, said the SRA, had "failed to deliver" on a promised action programme to improve the service. "They have let down the passengers, they have let down the industry, they have let us down"." Then Connex Chief Executive, Olivier Brousse, complained and the SRA used a modified line, that Connex's failure had been one of failing to put financial controls in place.

• So can the SRA be seen to be more favourable to Stagecoach and Virgin-Stagecoach than to other operators like Connex? A company either fails its customers or it doesn't … Connex has always declared its commitment to its franchises …So is Stagecoach's commitment perhaps greater? Rail Professional for November 2002 states that Graham Eccles, once fired by Connex, "hints that there is a real possibility that Stagecoach will walk away from the (SWT) franchise if it can't reach an agreement with the SRA. "If we can't get our (our underlining) terms we won't hesitate to walk away." So that's it. If Stagecoach keep the SWT franchise it will be on their terms. Talking about the current operating climate in the June 2003 edition, Mr Eccles asks "does Stagecoach want to be associated with that sort of business? Is it in our (our underlining) interests?"

• There you have it. Is the franchising system open and transparent? Is money invested in the interests of passengers or to stabilise companies? Are companies seen to be treated even-handedly? - First Group are generally considered to have done a better than average job in running Great Eastern. This did not help them get the new SWT franchise in place of failed Stagecoach. Now they have been ruled out of the bidding for Great Eastern itself and considered seeking judicial review. Press reports of the SRA's reasons for rejecting them suggest that First didn't fill in their application forms adequately and that their proposals were not ambitious enough! Hang on… What about Stagecoach's ambitious proposals for SWT which were mainly aspirational from the outset and, in retrospect, look like so much hogwash?

It is interesting to review what the Group said in the "Conclusions" in our Memorandum to the House of Commons Transport Select Committee, which was included in the Committee's report on franchising.

• What we said: "Best practice should be robustly pursued in all areas. This will tend to bring some degree of uniformity to a fragmented industry and make it less likely that anything will go seriously wrong in some particular corner."

• What we said: "The two-pronged approach of seeking public aspirations and industry proposals as discrete exercises should end. The Government should identify taxpayers’ aspirations, make strategic decisions, and negotiate with satisfactory operators. The worst operators should have no place in the industry, as the Deputy Prime Minister used to make clear."

• What we said: "In recognition of the problems for operators of long-term investment under short term contracts, the Government should negotiate with them to achieve its strategic aspirations. Instead of offering twenty year contracts in return for a mixture of committed outputs and long-term aspirations which may never materialise, the length of a contract should be relative to the scale of committed output. There should then be periodic reviews, perhaps every two years at which, subject to satisfactory performance and attainment of targets, the term of the contract could be rolled forward in return for additional commitments."

What's going well and what isn't?

• Greater certainty for the public. Private operators no longer able to dress their franchise bids with ambitious aspirations which may never be realised.

• Strategic planning means that future decisions should be made on the basis of practicability and public interest. Hopefully there will never again be anything like Anglia's proposed hourly Southampton-Feltham for Heathrow- Norwich service being thwarted by the introduction of SWT's unwanted additional off-peak Waterloo-Southampton trains within a package of timetable changes which brought many disbenefits for passengers. It's still as inconvenient as ever to get from Southampton to Heathrow by train.
• The improvement of performance is being given much greater priority.

• Mark I coaches likely to be eliminated within about a year of the Government's original deadline of 31 December 2004.

• One of the recently published goals of the Rail Passengers Committee for Southern England is to understand the needs and represent the views of passengers by maintaining contact with rail users groups. We hope the views we put forward may have their ear. This was not seen to happen when they chose Stagecoach for a further SWT franchise, and we were therefore fortunate to gain the ear of the Transport Select Committee when the opportunity arose. We know that other user groups share our views about SWT.

• The new Electrostar trains for Connex and South Central have family-friendly layouts, whereas the new long-distance Desiro trains for SWT appear to be ill-named, because most of the seating will be air-line style and not what families want. These trains have been dubbed as more commuter than Inter-City (Hogrider 92).

We are grateful to the Council for their invitation to attend. All three presentations were very informative.

The SRA's Capacity Utilisation Strategy has now been published. RPC had input into the September 2003 timetable planning. Agreed with beneficial changes and got some improvements to other changes, but would like to have achieved more. Would like the SRA to share their thought processes. Want a firm timetable process framework with RPC input. Propose that stakeholders like the regional Rail Passengers Committees, local government authorities, and operators should participate in discussions on route strategies. Routes need to be looked at in their totality. Connections important. Operators and Network Rail should discuss plans with other parties and then submit strategic timetables for public consultation.

Once strategic timetables finalised, incremental changes should also be subject to consultation. Operators should comment on one another's aspirations. There should be at least one meeting of all interested parties. Resulting data should go to Network Rail's timetable conference and revised timetables should be submitted for public consultation. Helpful if the Council could be invited to the conference. Regional RPCs have good links with Rail User Groups and can take account of their views. Possibility of more direct involvement by RUGs if numbers do not get unwieldy. Network Rail said they would respond in due course.

Passenger timetable to be published in December each year from 2004. Supplemental changes allowed at other times. Concerns that having only one timetable per year could mean less flexibility.

Imperatives are to improve performance, cater for growth and control costs through better engineering processes.

Congestion is not the only problem. Others are condition of assets, operational management, recovery, realistic timetabling - eg how long trains need to stand at stations, and spare rolling stock and crews.

60% of delays are reactionary (knock-on effects). 90% of capacity used on some routes out of London. Correlation between congestion and delays. Congestion depends on the number and mix of trains. Above 75% utilisation of capacity, disadvantages of running extra trains start to outweigh advantages.

Number of train kilometres are up 60% but passenger numbers up 10%. Operators have gone for frequency rather than longer trains.

Now need to get passenger numbers up. Still room for growth, but more complex issue than just train numbers. Scope to lengthen some trains. On very busy lines should trains be more similar to one another? Should freight train traction be more like passenger train traction? Strategy for Midland Main Line (St Pancras-Sheffield) already developed. Thameslink Trains between London and Bedford very overcrowded but spare capacity on some Midland Mainline expresses. These could make extra stops. Conflicting interests because longer-distance passengers would have longer journey times, but the imperative is to have fewer people standing.

Many trains in London area not full-length. Thames' services in and out of Paddington shorter than First Great Western's Inter-City 125s.

Another solution is to reduce the mix of trains. Thameslink 100mph trains and Midland Mainline 110mph trains share the same tracks. This means bigger gaps and fewer trains and worsens performance. A medium term solution would be to get 110mph trains on Thameslink. Alternatively, do Midland Mainline trains need to go at 110mph?

Utilisation strategy is about getting more out of routes. Full data on each route needed. For example, how many unused freight paths are there? Economic appraisal including how do we value time, non-user benefits? Each route utilisation strategy will have a formal consultation process.

The Council noted that the presentation was very positive, with no mention of cuts. SRA replied that near-empty trains on very busy parts of the network were not a good use of taxpayers' money.

What was the use of all these changes if the infrastructure not sorted out? The SRA replied that there were real opportunities, such as 30% increase in seats into Paddington, without expensive additional infrastructure.

The Council considered that whether a line should be for local or long-distance use should not be a matter for the SRA alone. SRA responded that there was no intention of ignoring regional views.

What exactly is a reactionary delay - a suicide can bring a string of trains to a standstill? SRA classified reactionary delays as late return workings by the affected stock.

Talk of longer trains, but Virgin had gone for shorter, more frequent trains and the 4-coach units were not to be brought up to five coaches. SRA said business case for 5 coaches not made. As demand grows, rolling stock position will need to be considered. Virgin was right to go for half-hourly services, but pity that implementation had not been smooth.

How can the SRA apply pressure to stakeholders to build more expensive trains and extend platforms. SRA said this was easier at the point of franchising.

What can be done about capacity on crowded South Eastern commuter routes? The SRA considered that there was more opportunity to improve utilisation on multi-operator routes like London-Brighton. Single-operator routes like London-Ramsgate probably achieving the best already.

Concern expressed that the SRA seems to think that everything goes to London. What about the withdrawn Bristol-Oxford service? When will the late night service from London to Bristol be reinstated? The SRA said that services were being looked at. Unbelievable that there was no direct service between Nottingham and Leeds.

Nothing in the Route Utilisation Strategies about fairness rather than economics. SRA said they wanted to measure benefits and take people's preferences into account.

Would the Transpennine route strategy link with the current franchise exercise. SRA commented that it was a pity the route utilisation strategy had not been done sooner.

What happens if you live outside a route utilisation strategy area? - A route is part of a network. Regional planning assessments? - The SRA said that everything was subject to affordability. Some things had low cost and high benefits.

Does the SRA agree with the RPC's consultation strategy? The SRA undertook to come back to them on that.

Limited time for points from the floor as this was an afternoon-only session. Concern that new services like Bristol-Oxford were not protected, even though popular. The SRA said that best use of a route would continue to be a balance of different uses.

While railway publicly funded, can we demand that regional economic policies are not ignored? The SRA replied positively.

Can small infrastructure changes which would make a big difference be given priority, eg in the Birmingham area which is the hub of the national rail network? The SRA said the agreed upgrade at Filton was a good example [incredibly the Bristol route joins the Paddington-South Wales line via a single track junction at Filton - this seems to be the major reason for delays to Cardiff-South Coast trains]

Is the SRA building bigger or managing what there is? SRA replied that the utilisation strategies are to get the best use out of what there is. This will achieve a well-used baseline against which extra capacity can be considered.

The SRA is to publish a consultation on rolling stock later this year. Doing nothing is not an option. Performance failures often attributable to rolling stock; overcrowding often arises from lack of enough rolling stock.

27 sets of class 175 trains were to be delivered for the North West during January-May 2000 to resolve problems there. Delivery started May 2000 and ended September 2001. 24 sets were to be available daily, but only 18 or fewer achieved. 70,000 kms per failure expected, but only 7,000 achieved. New trains not working 'out of the box'. Passengers suffered unreliable services, short trains, and continued use of 50-year old class 101 units. 'No end of grief to all manner of people'.

What happens to old trains like withdrawn Virgin Inter City 125s? Industry so disunited that couldn't get an answer. Some stand in sidings perhaps to be assigned to the scrapheap. Virgin 125s said to be too expensive to refurbish, but Midland Mainline units being refurbished.

The Pacer (bus-bodied) class 142 units will be around for another decade according to Richard Bowker. What can be done to improve them? Reservations about their safety following the severe damage sustained in the incident at Winsford several years ago.

Very little written about the Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCOs). No system of regulation, so potential for abuse of the market is rife. ROSCOs have added significantly to the costs of the railway. They were supposed to achieve market-led entrepreneurialism. Huge difference between SRA's interventionist approach and how the ROSCOs operate. £5bn invested. Something like £8bn raised through the train operators for the future. Big profits already taken out. Two companies providing identical trains for Virgin - unlikely to be any competitive pricing.

Rolling stock is too often route specific and cannot be redeployed. Two fleets of new Electrostar trains for the South East have incompatible couplings.

Wessex Trains wanted two additional class 153 coaches to relieve overcrowding in the Bristol area. These cost £500,000 in 1988, and are now being hired out for £250,000 a year. Easy to see how the economics of branch lines are being undermined.

Time to specify national rolling stock strategy. The Deputy Prime Minister had noted there was no regulation of the ROSCOs.

The Porterbrook ROSCO representative said discussions were ongoing with the SRA about the cascade of rolling stock. Always difficult to bring new stock into service. ROSCOs are involved in the specification of new stock. Once Network Rail has approved a design, ROSCOs concentrate on that design and on making it work. Under original leasing arrangements the operators bore the risks, and the SRA could pump money in as necessary. With later orders, procurement arrangements are not uniform.

There was a clear perceived threat to branch lines if the SRA doesn't tackle the ROSCOs. Buses would take over. Suggestion from the floor that a non-profit making ROSCO be set up (parallel with Network Rail) to make the existing ROSCOs competitive or drive them out of business.

The first commuting day of the 2003 Summer timetable brought yet more misery. The day started unremarkably, with even Eastleigh passengers finding it difficult to get a seat on the 05.42 Poole-Waterloo, and the 07.06 Basingstoke-Waterloo cancelled.

By the evening peak, there had been an 'incident' at Surbiton. 16.00 Southampton-Waterloo 30 minutes late. 15.47 Portsmouth-Waterloo 20 minutes late. 16.27 Alton-Waterloo 25 minutes late.

Stock for the 17.15 Waterloo-Weymouth arrived at 17.10 and left at 17.25. The train suffered slow running and reached Southampton about 30 minutes late at 18.55. The customer information screens showed that it was the 19.09 to Cardiff. Fortunately, the guard was award-winning Gerry Masters, who gave correct announcements on board the train. After this fiasco, and failure of station staff to oversee its departure, the Poole portion of the 17.15 left Southampton 37 minutes late at 19.10, with extra stops to compensate for the withdrawn Romsey-Totton service.

16.06 Romsey-Totton had terminated at Southampton. No alternative provisions made, and passengers who left Eastleigh at 16.21 got to Totton at about 17.45, an average journey speed of under 7mph.

16.34 Wareham-Waterloo took 75 minutes, instead of 40, to get from Bournemouth to Southampton. Two Virgin trains turned at Southampton instead of Bournemouth, and about 20 passengers from Bournemouth to the North missed both of them.

This was supposed to be the day that Wessex Electric units would take over the 18.05 Waterloo-Poole, in place of slam-door stock. At 17.55 the inward service (14.48 from Weymouth, due to arrive at 17.33) and the 18.05 itself were both advertised as delayed with no indication of the timescale. Some Southampton line passengers therefore caught the 17.56 Waterloo-Eastleigh-Portsmouth train, formed of old outer-suburban coaches. For Totton, there was then a choice: await the 18.05 at Winchester, or change at Eastleigh for the 19.14 from Romsey, due to leave at 19.34.

The 17.56 from London left Winchester 8 minutes late, at 19.09. The 18.05 from London was shown as expected at 19.08. Passengers stared up the line. Soon after 19.15 the customer information display revised the expected time to 19.15. Passengers' faces started to adopt their wry 'That's Stagecoach OK' expressions. Also at 19.15, the 17.49 to London departed, with Clapham Junction and Waterloo passengers to be thrown off at Woking.

Notable absence of staff on the platform at Winchester. Soon after 19.15, it was announced that the 18.05 hadn't even left Waterloo, due to a broken-down train, so the information screens had simply been giving false advice. The 18.30 Waterloo-Weymouth was advertised as delayed. The train to Brighton then arrived 10 minutes before its departure time. Passengers for Southampton were advised to take this train and change at Eastleigh.

Once the Brighton train departed, the guard announced that there would be a train from Eastleigh for stations to Southampton at 19.46; it was running late, but he didn't know how late. Asked about the train for Totton (19.34 from Eastleigh), he said all trains from London were running late. Told that the train started from Romsey, he said that the 19.46 was the Totton train. It wasn't worth asking any further, as the 19.46 is a long-standing Wessex Trains circular service from Swindon to Swindon, and doesn't serve stations to Southampton (except the Airport), let alone Totton which is not even on its route.

The Brighton train got to Eastleigh at 19.38. The 'late' 19.46 Wessex Trains service arrived at 19.43. At Southampton, it evolved that there was a broken rail at Millbrook and complete collapse of SWT services. No announcements, but enquiry established that there was a road coach outside the station for stations to Poole.

A quick check at Totton station established that the return service to Romsey was advertised as cancelled (we understand that Romsey-Totton services had been withdrawn for much of the day). The moving banner display proudly confirmed that the cancelled train would call at Chandlers Ford.

26/4/03 18.50 Waterloo-Poole 17 minutes late by Southampton. 19.20 Waterloo-Porstmouth Harbour 30 minutes late. 19.30 Waterloo-Weymouth 16 minutes late

28/4/03 05.42 Poole-Waterloo 7 minutes late awaiting a platform because of the late departure of the 08.00 Waterloo-Wareham. 15.06 Poole-Waterloo 12 minutes late.

29/4/03 06.42 Hilsea-Waterloo 10 minutes late.

30/4/03 At 18.00 nearly all mainline services at Waterloo were late: 16.01 from Portsmouth and 15.06 from Poole 12 minutes late, 15.34 from Wareham 8 minutes late. 17.51 Waterloo-Portsmouth left at 18.00

1/5/03 Could an evening out end more miserably? 22.55 Waterloo-Poole formed of two outer-suburban units in a generally poor state. Advertised buffet service not available. Train stone-cold by Southampton, and was to terminate at Bournemouth because of engineering work.

2/5/03 18.18 Waterloo-Dorking, 19.19 Dorking-Waterloo and 20.15 Waterloo-Dorking all advertised as 4 coaches only, due to faulty train. 18.50 Waterloo-Poole about 10 minutes late.

3/5/03 18.00 Brighton-Salisbury nearly 15 minutes late by Southampton. 21.20 Portsmouth-Waterloo cancelled due to no driver - fortunately only one hour until the next service.

6/5/03 18.05 Waterloo-Poole involved in smash at Clapham Junction. See separate item.

7/5/03 18.30 Waterloo-Weymouth left at 19.10 with many commuters standing; additional stop at Basingstoke. Stock for 18.50 to Poole expected at 19.25. 20.30 Waterloo-Weymouth and 20.35 Waterloo-Exeter both 15 minutes late.

8/5/03 Morning peak services widely disrupted when a Portsmouth train failed outside Waterloo station and needed attention by fitters.13 suburban trains trapped by points failure at Wimbledon depot. 05.42 from Poole reached Waterloo 10 minutes late; alighting passengers noted that the "information" screens showed no delays whatever. Major afternoon delays. 14.45 Waterloo-Wareham about 30 minutes late at Southampton. 15.00 Waterloo-Wareham 49 minutes late. 20.30 Waterloo-Weymouth 15 minutes late due to delay to an earlier service.

11/5/03 Afternoon services between Ascot and Aldershot collapsed due to a failed train.

12/5/03 05.42 Poole-Waterloo dreadfully overcrowded with many passengers standing from Eastleigh and Winchester. Similar overcrowding to Woking on the 17.56 Waterloo-Eastleigh-Portsmouth which departed at 18.00.

13/5/03 06.10 Portsmouth-Waterloo 10 minutes late. Lightning strike affected signals at Woking. Massive delays in evening peak. 15.45 Salisbury-Waterloo 45 minutes late and 16.15 simply advertised at Waterloo as delayed. 16.00 Southampton-Waterloo and 14.48 Weymouth-Waterloo both about 45 minutes late. 16.38 Alton-Waterloo cancelled and 17.48 Waterloo-Alton started from Woking. 16.17 Portsmouth-Waterloo about 30 minutes late. 17.51 Waterloo-Portsmouth made extra stops; the stock was expected to reach London 20 minutes after its departure time. Stock for 17.56 Waterloo-Portsmouth via Eastleigh expected about 15 minutes after its departure time. 18.05 Waterloo-Poole was roughly on time but hugely overcrowded to Woking.

17/5/03 10.48 Weymouth-Waterloo 15 minutes late at Southampton.

18/5/03 07.50 Waterloo-Bournemouth was the first train from London since 1969 with a connection for Chandlers Ford; 25 minutes late and connection missed. 09.30 Waterloo-Weymouth about 15 minutes late.

19/5/03 Services collapsed: see separate item.

21/5/03 15.04 Poole-Waterloo over 15 minutes late. 16.17 Portsmouth-Waterloo nearly 10 minutes late. 20.20 Waterloo-Portsmouth reduced to 4 coaches.

26/5/03 Huge Bank Holiday disruption for SWT passengers due to engineering works. Usual chaos at Southampton Central because the Customer Misinformation System cannot distinguish between platforms 3A and 3B, and lumps together the departures from both. So it was that the 13.48 to Poole sat at platform 3B, with the adjacent screen showing it as the 13.47 to Portsmouth Harbour. Fortunately, the incoming stock for the Portsmouth train was so late that the screens did eventually change to show the 13.48 as the next departure.

27/5/03 06.26 Poole-Waterloo 10 minutes late at Totton and 18 minutes late by London.

28/5/03 There seems to be a permanent speed restriction at Worting Junction, which slows trains on the down journey. 17.15 Waterloo-Weymouth about 7 minutes late at Southampton.

2/6/03 05.42 Poole-Waterloo suffered inhuman overcrowding. The conductor called on all SWT employees to give up their seats to fare paying passengers.

5/6/03 16.20 Exeter-Waterloo over 20 minutes late; 18.51 Basingstoke-Waterloo 10 minutes late.

6/6/03 Noted at both Totton and Southampton Central that screens were announcing Totton-Romsey services as calling at Chandlers Ford whereas the stop was omitted from tannoy announcements. This inevitably confuses passengers and can be seen as slipshod.

9/6/03 17.15 Waterloo-Weymouth 10 minutes late due to signal problems in the Woking area. 15.34 Wareham-Waterloo over 30 minutes late.

10/6/03 15.48 from Weymouth and 16.34 from Wareham both over 10 minutes late into Waterloo. 18.50 Waterloo-Poole departed several minutes late and was delayed several more minutes at Micheldever pending the doors being opened.

11/6/03 12.00 Southampton-Waterloo reduced to 4 coaches due to duff rolling stock.

12/6/03 At 18.00 most mainline services were arriving at Waterloo 5-10 minutes late. 18.08 to Haslemere reduced to 4 coaches. 18.05 to Poole left at 18.10 and, with generally sluggish running, was 10 minutes late by Winchester. Rubber lining around a non-public door in the buffet coach of unit 2417 had such a gaping hole that passengers could watch the trackside.

13/6/03 15.44 from Exeter, 15.48 from Weymouth and 16.06 from Poole all about 15 minutes late into Waterloo. Some other mainline services 5-10 minutes late. 17.15 to Weymouth arrived at Waterloo in two parts, the second at 17.05. Train departed at 17.20 and was over 20 minutes late by Southampton; signal checks en route to Clapham Junction but no official explanation whatever. Huge numbers standing to Winchester and serious problems with the air conditioning. 18.05 Waterloo-Poole left at 18.30 and was 40 minutes late by Totton. The conductor told passengers for Weymouth to change at Brockenhurst, but the train was held at Millbrook for the 18.30 to sweep past. The conductor then apologised and said he could only pass on what he was told - familiar story of SWT's failure to get its act together! 18.30 to Weymouth left Waterloo at 18.49, with many standing or sitting on the floor. Lost another 4 minutes by Southampton; no explanation of the delay. Connection for stations from Swaythling to Totton not honoured, meaning delays of up to one hour. 18.50 Waterloo-Poole 10 minutes late; stifling hot conditions in third coach due to duff air conditioning.

15/6/03 General delays to Waterloo-Bournemouth services reported during the evening.

16/6/03 Dreadful overcrowding on the 05.42 Poole-Waterloo with passengers standing from Southampton Airport. The guard amusingly asked passengers to keep the aisles clear for the buffet trolley. Difficult to see how this could be achieved unless they sat on the luggage racks or between the seat backs. At 18.00 most mainline arrivals at Waterloo were running 5-15 minutes late.

17/6/03 06.10 Portsmouth-Waterloo had not reached Eastleigh 10 minutes after its departure time. A commuter in the front coach of the 18.50 Waterloo-Poole joined the ranks of SWT passengers lucky to escape spinal damage when their seats collapse under them.

18/6/03 08.30 Waterloo-Weymouth delayed 6 minutes at Southampton while the units were uncoupled and passengers compacted into the front portion. 15.48 Weymouth-Waterloo about 15 minutes late at Southampton. 16.33 Portsmouth-Southampton about 45 minutes late. Incredible state of chaos at Southampton Central: SWT staff were debating in front of a crowd of passengers whether the 17.55 to Brockenhurst would actually run, when the overcrowded 5-coach 18.12 to Poole arrived on another platform and there was a stampede across the footbridge. 17.15 Waterloo-Weymouth left at 17.20 and was 10 minutes late by Southampton.

19/6/03 16.01 Portsmouth-Waterloo 10 minutes late. Duff air-conditioning reported in some coaches of the 16.30 Waterloo-Weymouth and 18.05 Waterloo-Poole. Paddington-Reading services withdrawn due to lineside fire and exploding gas canisters. Passengers advised to travel via Waterloo and Basingstoke, presumably because of the very limited capacity on Waterloo-Reading direct services. Terrible crush on Basingstoke trains, with passengers in some cases leaning against doors in ancient Mark I coaches. 17.45 Waterloo-Weymouth so overcrowded that some regular users unable to board. The 18.05 Waterloo-Poole had scores of empty seats; presumably too much trouble to arrange a Basingstoke stop which would have cost around 4 minutes - the train was in any case 4 minutes late by Totton.

20/6/03 06.00 Southampton-Poole already 7 minutes late by Totton. 14.48 Weymouth-Waterloo 32 minutes late; arrived at Waterloo at 18.05 to form the 18.05 to Poole. Other mainline trains arriving at Waterloo 5-15 minutes late. The 18.05 left at 18.14, but the slower 18.10 to Yeovil was sent just in front, so it failed to recover any time despite having 8 minutes slack to Winchester because it is still scheduled for old Mark I stock but actually operated with a pair of Wessex Electric units.

21/6/03 Big morning delays due to a signal failure at Dorchester.

23/6/03 Day of chaos. Points and signalling failure in the New Malden area. 05.42 Poole-Waterloo 25 minutes late; at Vauxhall it overtook an earlier Wessex main line service which had travelled via Staines. 11.35 Waterloo-Plymouth 46 minutes late. 12.35 Waterloo-Exeter 37 minutes late. 16.00 Brighton-Reading started from Fareham. 13.48 Weymouth-Waterloo 24 minutes late; all passengers not wanting Waterloo were thrown off at Bournemouth as stops at wayside halts like Southampton Central were omitted for operational convenience. 15.38 Waterloo-Portsmouth started from Woking. 14.48 Weymouth-Waterloo completed its journey 27 minutes late, at 18.00. Passengers who had boarded the 17.15 Waterloo-Weymouth were thrown off. The front half then left at 17.10 as the 16.45 to Poole, with inhuman overcrowding. After attachment of another unit at 17.16, the 17.15 itself left at 17.26 and was 20 minutes late by Southampton. 17.45 Waterloo-Weymouth left at 17.57. 15.04 Poole-Waterloo and 16.17 Portsmouth-Waterloo both about 10 minutes late. Third coach of 18.05 Waterloo-Poole had tropical heating and the fifth coach had arctic cold. The train appeared clapped-out and, despite the 8 minutes slack in this service between Waterloo and Winchester (due to the change of rolling stock), it arrived at the latter 10 minutes late. Three passengers were lucky to get off at Totton, because no announcement about short platforms was given after departure from Southampton. Many passengers are less lucky. If all guards controlled the doors from the middle of 10-coach trains - as some do - this would be less of a problem.

24/6/03 05.42 Poole-Waterloo 15 minutes late - delay at Clapham Junction due to duff preceding train.

30/6/03 Is anyone's spine safe from injury on SWT trains? Two adjacent seats on the 05.42 Poole-Waterloo collapsed under passengers. The train was 10 minutes late due to slow-line working East of Basingstoke. The 06.53 Poole-Waterloo was already 15 minutes late by Southampton.

1/7/03 General delays at Waterloo to incoming evening services. At around 17.00, London services advertised at Southampton as running late due to shortage of drivers at Bournemouth depot. 14.48 from Weymouth over 25 minutes late. 15.04 from Poole, 15.34 from Wareham, 16.17 from Portsmouth and 16.47 from Basingstoke all about 10 minutes late. 17.56 to Guildford via Epsom reduced to 4 coaches and 17.58 to Guildford via Weybridge delayed by needing attention from an engineer. Second coach of the 18.05 Waterloo-Poole virtually unused due to duff air-conditioning. Train was 5 minutes late by Totton despite the 8 minutes slack in its schedule, which was devised for Mark I stock.

2/7/03 05.42 Poole-Waterloo and 07.18 Basingstoke-Waterloo about 15 minutes late. 06.19 Poole-Waterloo and 06.10 Portsmouth-Eastleigh-Waterloo about 10 minutes late. Seat collapsed under passenger in second coach of the 05.42.

3/7/03 06.10 from Portsmouth and 06.19 from Poole over 5 minutes late into Waterloo. 15.04 from Poole and 15.34 from Wareham both about 10 minutes late into London. 18.05 Waterloo-Poole had a very slow run to Woking, due apparently to a duff preceding train. Train was 10 minutes late by Eastleigh, despite the 10 minutes slack in its schedule.

4/7/03 Such is the shortage of rolling stock on SWT that the 16.09 from Waterloo to Woking, 17.29 and 17.59 to Hampton Court and 18.53 to Chessington were all pre-advertised as comprised of 4 coaches only.